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Introduction 
The U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC), International Trade Administration, found 
that Cutrale, Citrosuco (Fisher), Montecitrus and other Brazilian firms dumped orange  juice (OJ) in 
the United States over the period from October 2003 through September 2004.  This dumping 
contributed to a build up of Florida OJ inventories and resulted in low OJ prices. 
The United States tends to have excess demand for OJ, while the rest of the world (RW) 
tends to have excess supply. U.S. excess demand-the  difference between total U.S. demand and 
what the United States can supply from domestic production-  is demand for imports. RW excess 
supply-the  difference between RW supply and RW demand-is  supply to fulfill the U.S. import 
demand. The (quantity of) excess demand increases as the price of OJ decreases and vice versa, 
while the (quantity of) excess supply decreases as the price decreases  and vice versa. In equilibrium, 
price is such that U.S. excess demand equals RW excess supply. 
When dumping occurs, this excess supply-demand equilibrium is disturbed.  Initially, the 
price of OJ in the United States decreases with dumping, which, in turn, increases the quantity of 
U.S. excess demand. At this point U.S. excess demand would be greater than RW excess supply. 
This difference results in an increase in the price in the RW, freeing up supply for the U.S. market. 
Thus, there is a positive discrepancy between the Brazil FOB price charged to customers in the RW 
and the United States. 
Estimates of Dumping Impact on Prices 
The excess supply-demand approach described above is used here to estimate the impact of 
dumping on OJ prices. By definition, dumping occurs when OJ is imported into the United States 
below cost, resulting in more OJ in the United States and lower U.S. OJ prices than otherwise.  Let 
p be the Brazil FOB price that reflects full cost. Let the price at which OJ is dumped be p times (1 -A) 
or p(1-A) where A is a dumping margin (O<  A <I).'  The price for OJ landed in the United States 
includes the tariff and transportation charges.  Let this price be denoted by p, = p(1-A) + T, where 
T stands for these tariff and transportation charges. OJ in this analysis is treated as a homogeneous 
commodity, and OJ produced from domestic oranges and imported OJ are assumed to receive the 
same price (p,). 
Let Q,and Q, be U.S. and RW OJ supply levels (production plus beginning inventory levels), 
respectively. Let q, be U.S. consumer OJ demand.  Let q, be RW consumer OJ demand, including 
'  The U.S. Department of Commerce dumping margin is defined with respect to the dumping price, not the 
full cost price p as in the present study.  That is, denoting the dumping price as p,  which equals p (14) in this paper, 
the USDOC margin y is defined by p = p,(l+ y) or p,  = p/(l+ y).  Thus,  p,  = p (1-1) = p/(l+ y), implying (1-1) = 
1/(1+ y) or, solving ,  A = yl(l+y). demand for U.S. exports.' These demands are functions of prices: q, = ql(p,)  = q,(p(l-A) + T); q2= 
q2(p).  Let demand for ending inventories in the United  States (I,) and RW (I,)  be  similarly 
proportional (a) to the consumer demands; i.e., I,@,) = aql(p,) and 12(p) = aq2(p).  Thus total 
consumer and inventory demands are (l+a  )q,(p,) in the United States and (1 + a)  q2(p)  in the RW. 
Consider changes in the above various supply and demand components  as a result of a change 
in the dumping margin.  These changes will allow estimation of the impacts of dumping on the 
Brazil price p and the U.S. price p,. 
Assume the United States has excess demand at the  world equilibrium price or 
Equation (1) implies that the United States imports OJ. 
The excess supply in the world is 
This excess supply defines the U.S. import supply curve, net of exports. 
In equilibrium, excess demand equals excess supply or 
The above relationship ignores some of the spatial equilibrium dimensions of the problem, 
but captures basic market forces.  The price is set so this relationship holds. 
If the dumping margin A  is changed in equation (3), U.S. excess demand changes upsetting 
the equilibrium condition. To re-establish equilibrium,  the price p changes. To determine this price 
change, equation (3) is differentiated with respect to A and p, holding supply fixed, i.e., 
or, solving for dp, 
where dqldp =  (dq,Idp,)(l -A) +  (dq2/dp). Notice that the factor of proportionality (l+a)  for U.S. and 
RW inventories cancels out. 
Result (5) indicates the impact of the dumping margin on the Brazil price p.  Given this 
result, the impact of the dumping margin on the U.S. price (p,  = p(1-A) + T) is then (6)  dp, = (1-A) dp - pdA 
First, result (5) is estimated as follows. Assume the FOB Santos price is $.60 per single 
strength equivalent (SSE) gallon.2 The USDOC preliminary dumping margin varies across Brazil 
firms ranging from .6029 to .2462.  Assuming the average USDOC margin is 113 and this value 
reflects past dumping pricing, A=1/4 in the present study.3 Hence, the term pdA =  ($.60)(1/4) =  $. 15. 
In a recent study  "Generic  Promotions and Florida Citrus," by  a Panel of Economist 
appointed by  the Florida Citrus Commission, April 8, 2005, the U.S.  consumer demand slope 
(dq,/dp,) was estimated at -500 million SSE gallons per dollar change in price.  The same study 
estimated the RW demand slope (dq2/dp)  at -789. 
Hence, the estimated impact of dumping is 
(7)  dp = ((500)/((500)(1-.25)  + 789)) (.60)(.25) = $.06/SSE gallon. 
That is, dumping in the United States tends to increase the Brazil price p paid in the RW by 
$.06/SSE gallon. Less OJ sold in the RW fetches a higher price. 
On the other hand, the dumped OJ in the United States decreases the U.S. price p,.  Based 
on equation (6) and result (7), the decrease in the U.S. price is 
(8)  dp, = (1-.25) (.06) - (.60)(.25) = -.105. 
That is, dumping tends to decrease the U.S. price by an estimated $. 1051SSE gallon. 
The above estimates provide an indication of the price tendency caused by dumping.  The 
present ruling is intended to eliminate this tendency. That is, A is zero with the imposed penalties. 
Going Forward 
The USDOC ruling imposes dumping margins that vary across Brazil firms, ranging from 
.6029 to .2462.  These margins are applied to the FOB Brazil price but are not additional tariff 
charges to the extent the Brazil firms get the money back. The USDOC ruling requires that a Brazil 
firm exporting OJ product to the United States must deposit with U.S. Customs an amount equal to 
the margin imposed on that firm times the FOB value of the firm's exported product. This money 
is to be  held by U.S. Customs for about a year, while that firm's price and cost records associated 
with the exports are checked to determine whether dumping has occurred over the period.  If 
The assumed FOB Santos price is a rough guess; it would be consistent with a U.S. FOB price of about 
$l.OO/SSE gallon, given the FCOJ tariff of $.297/SSE gallon and a transportation charge of about $. 1OISSE gallon. 
3  Based on footnote 1,  A = yl(l+y) = (1/3)/(1+1/3)=1/4. USDOC finds dumping has occurred, the firm loses the deposit. If dumping does not occur the firm 
gets back the deposit including interest.  The interest rate provided may, however, be less than the 
internal rate of return that the Brazil firm may be able to earn.  Additionally, the Brazil firm must 
pay legal fees and has a risk of losing the deposit due to an unfavorable legal decision. 
Estimates of Price Impacts of the Dumping Deposit 
Again, let p be the Brazil FOB price.  Let A now be the percentage of price p that must be 
deposited with the U.S. government. That is, Ap  is kept in a deposit for a year and then returned (if 
no dumping) along with interest.  Let the interest rate that the Government provides be r,.  Let the 
internal discount rate for Brazilian firms be r,. This latter rate is assumed to reflect both investment 
opportunities and the risk of losing the deposit. Assume r, > r,  and let r = r,- r, be the net discount 
rate.  Without a dumping deposit, the price for OJ landed in the United States including tariff and 
transportation charges is p, = p + T where T is again the U.S. per unit tariff and transportation costs. 
With the dumping deposit, the U.S. price is p, = p(l+A) - Ap/(l+r) + T. Initially, a Brazil firm pays 
to the U.S. Government the tariff and transportation charge T plus the amount Ap,  but get backs the 
amount Ap  one year later. The present value of this latter amount is Ap/(l +r). 
Note that the above U.S. price  p, = p(l+A) - Ap/(l+r) + T can be written somewhat more 
simply as 
Again, let Q, and Q, be U.S. and RW OJ supply levels (production plus beginning inventory 
levels), respectively.  Let q, be U.S. consumer OJ demand.  Let q, be RW consumer OJ demand, 
including demand for U.S. exports.  These demands are functions of prices: q, = q,(p,) = q,(p(l+ 
r(l+A))/(l+r) + T); q2  = q2(p). Let demand for ending inventories in the United States (I,) and RW 
(I,) be similarly proportional (a) to the consumer demands; i.e., I,(@,)  = aq,(p,) and I,(p) = aq,(p). 
Thus total consumer and inventory demands are (l+a  )q,(p,) in the United States and (1 + a)  q,(p) 
in the RW. 
Consider changes in the above supply and demand components as a result of a change in the 
dumping deposit term A.  These changes will allow estimation of the impacts of dumping deposit 
on the Brazil price p and the U.S. price p,. 
Assume the United States has excess demand at the  world equilibrium price p or 
Again, equation (1  0) implies that the United States imports OJ. 
The excess supply in the world is Again, this excess supply defines the U.S. import supply curve, net of exports. 
In equilibrium, excess demand equals excess supply or 
The price p is set so this relationship holds. 
If the dumping deposit term 31.  is changed in equation (12), U.S.  excess demand changes 
upsetting the equilibrium condition. To re-establish equilibrium, the price p changes. To determine 
this price change, equation (1  2) is differentiated with respect to 31. and p, holding supply fixed, i.e., 
or, solving for dp, 
-  where  dq/dp = (dq,/dp,)(l+r(l+A))/(l+r)  + dq,/dp.  Again, note that the factor of  proportionality 
(l+a) for U.S. and RW inventories cancels out. 
Result (14) indicates the impact of the dumping deposit on the Brazil price p.  Given this 
result, the impact of the dumping deposit on the U.S. price (p, = p(l+ r(l+A))/(l+r) + T) is 
(1  5)  dp, = (  1  +r(l +31.))/(1  +r)dp + (pr/(l  +r))d31.. 
Note that when the net discount rate r is zero (the U.S. interest rate equals the Brazil discount 
rate), there is no impact of the dumping deposit on the Brazil and U.S. prices.  In general, when r 
> 0, there is some impact, although possibly small. 
Assume the following 
p = $1.40/ps  (Brazil price) 
r = .05  (net discount rate) 
31. = .20  (dumping deposit average across imports) 
dk= .20  (change from A=  0 to A=  .20) 
(dq,/dp,) = -500  (U.S. consumer demand slope as discussed above) 
(d%/dp) = -789  (RW demand slope as discussed above). 
In equation (14), the term  dq/dp = (dql/dpl)(l+r(l+31.))/(l+r)  + (dq,/dp is 
-500*(1+(.05)(1.20))/1.05 -789 = -1293.8. The term (dq,/ap,)/(aq/ap) in equation (14) is -500/(-1293.8) = .386. 
Thus, equation (1  4), which shows the impact of the U.S.  dumping deposit on the Brazil price, 
is evaluated as 
Equation (15), which shows the impact of the U.S. dumping deposit on the U.S. price ,  is 
evaluated at 
(17)  dp, = ((1 + (.05)(1.20))/1.05)(-.005)+ ((1.40)(.05)/(1.05))(.20)  = $.008/ps. 
That is, the  dumping deposit is estimated to result in about % centlps decline in the Brazil 
price and 811 0 cent Ips increase in the U.S.  price. This results involves a small diversion of OJ from 
the U.S. to the ROW due to the relatively small negative  impact of the dumping deposit in 
conjunction with the net discount rate on Brazil's returns. Again, if the net discount rate were zero, 
there would be no impact on prices. 
How sensitive are the price impacts to the net discount rate assumption? If the net discount 
rate r were cut in half (.025), the Brazil price is estimated to decline by  $.003/ps, while the U.S. 
price is estimated to increase by $.004/ps.  Alternatively, if  r were doubled (.lo), the Brazil price 
is estimated to decline by  $.Ol/ps, while the U.S. price is estimated to increase by  $.016/ps. 
respectively. 
The legal and administrative costs for Brazil, as well as the U.S. Government, are considered 
as lump sum costs which do not varying with the OJ import volume, and as such are not expected 
to impact marginal relationships and prices in the short run.  These costs do, however, impact the 
profit of the firms involves, and may have some longer run implications. Lower profits may result 
in less invested in groves and trees and impact long run supplies. 
Conclusions 
In recent years, dumping contributed to a build up of Florida OJ inventories and reduced 
Florida OJ prices by an estimated $.lO/ps during that period.  To remedy this situation, the U.S. 
government imposed dumping charges on a number of Brazilian firms in 2005.  The amounts 
collected are kept in a deposit.  The Government monitors the situation and provided a firm is not 
found to be dumping, its deposit is returned along with interest after one year.  There are, however, 
some costs associated with this scheme that may impact the OJ price situation. The Brazil firms may 
be able to earn a higher rate on their earnings than provided by the interest that the U.S.  Government 
pays.  Additionally, Brazil firms, as well as the U.S. Government, have administrative and legal 
costs.  The risk of losing the deposit to an unfavorable legal ruling may also be a factor.  The 
possible higher rates that Brazil firms may earn including a risk factor  are estimated to result in 
relatively small impacts on prices-near  or less than 1  centlps. The Brazil FOB price would decrease slightly with a relatively small amount of OJ diverted from the U.S. to the rest of the world, while 
the U.S. price would increase slightly with a smaller amount of OJ in the U.S. after the diversion. 
The administrative and legal costs do not change marginal costs and are not expected to impact 
short-run prices but do impact the profits of the companies involved, and could possibly impact 
long-run supply negatively to the extent lower profits reduce investments in groves and trees made 
by these companies. 
Disclaimer: The proceeding analysis assumes that at current prices (the Brazil FOBprice around 
$1.40/ps) dumping is not occurring and the only direct cost to the 'dumpers' of the anti-dumping 
order is the net discount rate on the dumping margin that is held by the Usgovernment  for one year 
during investigation. Other costs are considered (legal  fees,  risk factors) but not quantiJied. The 
relatively small impact to.  Florida prices hinges on the assumptions that Brazil S price  is about 
$1.40, and thatprice is above their costs. The Jitture situation with respect to this assumption may 
not be the same. Brazilian prices may not remain around $1.40 (e.g.,  prices may decline as a result 
of larger than expected crops  from Brazil and/or other countries; or higher prices may result in a 
larger-than -expected decrease in the quantity demanded,  particularly in Europe, and may not hold), 
or $1.40 may not cover Brazilian costs ofproduction (i.  e.,  fiuitprices and/or costs of disease control 
rise rapidly). Ifthese assumptions are not accurate the results of this analysis would not be accurate. 